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InTRoDuCTIon
in recent years, the investment strategy called carry trade 
(hereinafter  referred  to  as  Ct)  has  become  a  focus  of 
economic policy and theoretical economic literature. Ct is 
frequently  associated  with  the  extreme  appreciation  and 
volatility  of  currencies  in  emerging  markets,  and  with 
increased correlation amongst these currencies. Ct may be 
an important factor in the contagion of crises through the 
exchange rate channel. Additionally, many blame Ct for the 
credit cycles seen in emerging markets so frequently, the 
resulting indebtedness of these countries which often end 
up in economic crises or recession. On the whole, economic 
policy  decision-makers  uniformly  feel  that  Ct  inflow  is 
clearly non-desirable, and is to be prevented by administrative 
means if necessary.
by contrast, the assessment of Ct in the theoretical literature 
is substantially more complex. numerous studies are built on 
the assumption that high carry returns may be sustained over 
longer periods of time, because high interest rate currency 
instruments are purchased by only a few. According to this 
view, Ct flows should even be encouraged. At the same time, 
the correlation between Ct and sudden weakening of the 
exchange  rates  is  clear.  Such  investors  finance  themselves 
with the use of loans and when their leverage must be cut 
back they are compelled to sell their high yielding currencies 
against low yielding currencies. When such transactions are 
conducted by many economic agents simultaneously, it may 
become a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop. therefore, 
Ct is indeed very dangerous in countries where the portfolio 
of open exchange rate positions is high.
the purpose of this short paper is to provide an overview from 
the point of view of economic policy of the studies published 
in the topic. it is hoped that the paper will contribute to a 
deeper and more thorough understanding of the root causes 
and potential consequences of Ct inflow. i attempted to make 
an estimate of the past extent of Ct activity in the Hungarian 
forint market. in general, it can be concluded that foreigners 
failed to increase their HuF exposure over the years since 
2000.  in  consequence,  their  Ct  activity  could  not  cause  a 
massive rise in the external debt of the Hungarian economy in 
the  period.  nevertheless,  the  role  of  Ct  in  exchange  rate 
dynamics has grown during the past few years.
wHAT IS CARRy TRADE?
Some papers call almost all foreign investment Ct, whereas 
the theoretical literature identifies Ct as a clearly defined 
foreign currency market trading strategy.
Broad carry trade
in the broadest sense, Ct is any kind of investment financed 
from  a  loan,  i.e.  a  leveraged  transaction.  the  investor 
buying a risky instrument financed with credit is confronted 
with the cash flows presented in table 1. upon concluding 
the deal (that is, at t=0) he takes out the loan necessary for 
buying the instrument, and then actually buys the instrument 
(at  a  price  S0).  upon  maturity  (at  t=1)  the  carry  trader 
receives the payoff on his investment (rH) and pays back the 
loan. thus, net cash flow at t=1 is S0(erH–erL). Assuming that 
the investor’s credit quality is high, and that the instrument 
to be purchased is risky, the pre-defined interest rate of the 
loan (rL ) shall be lower than the expected return on the 
investment (E0(rH)). this way, the strategy will be profitable 
over the long run. there may, however, be periods when the 
return on the investment ex-post falls short of the interest 
payable on the loan and the carry trader incurs a loss.
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in this example, the investor will not tie up any of his own 
capital, and thus the potential profit realised upon maturity 
will be gained with zero investment costs. However, if the 
risky  instrument  pays  a  lower  return  ex-post  than  the 
interest payable on the loan used to purchase it, a payment 
obligation will be incurred automatically. Gearing enlarges 
the returns on the investment, but it proportionally enlarges 
its standard deviation as well.
Provided the investors’ expected return on the investments 
(E(rH ) – rL) is growing or their risk aversion is declining, 
their demand for the risky instruments will increase. Such a 
situation may occur when financing costs are reduced (for 
instance,  central  banks  in  developed  countries  ease  their 
monetary policy), or when the expected returns on the risky 
instruments grow (for instance, as the result of an economic 
boom).
the long-term profitability of this strategy is explained by 
the risk assumed. large investors can access funding nearly 
at the risk-free interest rates. High risk instruments must 
ensure higher returns than that.
this definition of Ct is very general. Almost all institutional 
investors  (commercial,  investment  banks,  hedge  funds) 
finance their investments using loans, and thus they fit well 
into the broad definition of a carry trader. in addition, the 
risky instrument may be denominated in the same currency 
as the financing credit, therefore such transactions do not 
necessarily involve emerging markets.
Carry trade as a foreign exchange 
market trading strategy
Ct in the narrower sense is the investment strategy in which 
the carry trader takes out a loan in low yielding currencies 
and invests it in high yielding currencies. investors obtain 
their yield (y–t) from two sources, the difference between 
the interest rates (rH–rL) which is known ex-ante and the 
movement in the exchange rate during maturity which is not 
known  beforehand.  in  formal  terms,  this  is  expressed  as 
follows:
  y=rH –rL – Ds  (1)
where s stands for the logarithm of the exchange rate (the 
higher the value, the weaker the high interest rate currency). 
if both countries (i.e. the one with high short-term interest 
rates and the other one with low short-term interest rates) 
have similar sovereign rating, it will not be clear what risks 
are assumed by the investor.1 thus, it is not necessarily the 
case  that  this  strategy  is  systematically  profitable.  if  two 
instruments have the same risk, but their expected returns 
are  different,  all  investors  would  sell  the  low  return 
instrument  and  buy  high  return  one  instead,  until  the 
expected returns equalised. this mechanism ensures that no 
long-term  arbitrage  possibilities  exist  on  the  financial 
markets.
Hence, if the currencies are similarly risky, the expected 
return on Ct shall be zero. Here, with the help of (1), the 
equation of uncovered interest rate parity (uiP) will be set 
up as follows:
  E(Ds)=rH – rL  (2)
in other words, a positive difference in interest rates must 
predict  weakening  of  the  high  interest  rate  currency. 
irrespective of the interest rate being higher in one of the 
countries,  the  exchange  rate  movement  is  expected  to 
balance returns. this relationship was first tested by Fama 
(1984), estimating the following equation using the most 
developed G10 foreign currencies which have similarly low 
sovereign risk:2 
 D(s) = a
∧ + b
∧
  (rH – rL) + e.  (3)
Should uiP apply, then a=0, b=1. Fama – and everybody 
else estimating similar equations since – obtained a negative 
coefficient  for  b
∧
.  this  means  that  high  interest  rate 
currencies  usually  appreciate  against  low  interest  rate 
currencies, and therefore Ct is a profitable strategy over 
the  long  run.  the  negative  coefficient  means  that  the 
investor not only gains the interest rate differential, but 
also earns additional profits by the strengthening of the 
high yielding currency. efforts to explain this phenomenon 
– called the uiP or Ct puzzle in the theoretical literature 
– have spawned a large number of theories, which will be 
discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  following.  in  any  case, 
foreign  exchange  market  funds  apply  this  investment 
strategy in practice, and their activities may be decisive in 
the  exchange  rate  dynamics  of  the  foreign  currency  in 
question.





  Cash flows of a carry trader
1	Exchange	rate	volatility	in	itself	is	not	a	sufficient	reason	to	support	a	risk	premium	provided	it	does	qualify	as	a	non-systematic	risk.
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investors on the foreign exchange market attempt to take 
exchange rate positions in such a manner that they minimise 
both trading costs and counterparty risk.3 For this purpose, 
derivative instruments are the most suitable candidates. Ct 
is implemented most frequently with the use of a forward 
(or synthetic forward) transaction. the price of a foreign 
exchange forward contract (F0) can best be determined as 
follows: 
  F0=S0erH–rL,  (4)
where  S0  is  the  spot  price.4  upon  maturity,  the  profit 
generated by the transaction (F0–S1) is the same as if the 
investor had purchased government bonds with maturity at 
t=1 denominated in the high interest rate currency using 
loans taken out in the low interest currency. the difference 
is  that  the  derivatives  market  is  much  more  liquid,  and 
therefore if the investor intends to close his position before 
maturity, he can only do so on the government bond market 
at a much higher trading cost.
the bulk of derivative transactions does not appear in the 
balance  of  payments  statistics.  if  a  resident  concludes  a 
forward  transaction  on  the  exchange  rate  with  a  non 
resident, it will only be seen upon maturity, and only then 
to the extent of the final cash flow (provided the foreign 
party earns any profits on the transaction, as an outflow, or 
vice-versa).5 Forward transactions do not represent financing 
either, thus the derivative portfolio of foreigners in the high 
yielding  currency  may  increase,  even  if  its  economy 
experiences a period of net capital outflow.
Derivative markets on foreign currency are of significant 
sizes. table 2 shows stocks of derivative contracts related to 
emerging  market  currencies  taken  from  the  biS  triennial 
survey.6 the data reflect the face value of such derivative 
transactions where one of the foreign exchange counterparts 
is  the  currency  of  an  emerging  market.  On  average,  this 
stock  grew  by  2  thousand  billion  uSD  annually  between 
2001 and 2007. this inflow can be compared in terms of 
size with the one realised by emerging market countries in 
the same period in terms of net capital inflow (including 
portfolio, foreign direct investment and loan type flows).7 
unfortunately, no information is available on the direction 
of the position (i.e. whether long or short in the emerging 
currency), but there are good reasons to believe that the 
dynamic expansion is underpinned by speculation demand 
for the foreign currency of emerging market countries.
in the following, i analyse the narrower interpretation of 
Ct. this activity is mostly restricted to the foreign exchange 
market.
Foreign exchange loans
before  embarking  on  a  more  in-depth  discussion  of  Ct 
transactions  as  an  investment  strategy  on  the  foreign 
exchange markets, let us make a short detour with respect 
to  foreign  exchange  lending.  taking  out  an  uncovered 
foreign exchange loan can be regarded as a naive form of 
carry trade. the borrower of the foreign exchange loan pays 
lower  instalments  than  agents  taking  out  loans  in  the 
domestic  (higher  interest)  currency,  as  long  as  the  high 
interest domestic currency does not weaken to the extent 
corresponding  to  the  uiP.  However,  the  foreign  investor 
extending the foreign exchange loan cannot be considered 
to be a carry trader at any rate, since his exposure will be 











June 2001 June 2004 June 2007
Total	FX 4,961	 6,801	 17,302	
Forward	and	FX-swap 3,333	 4,319	 9,766	
Currency	swap 1,003	 1,513	 3,561	
Options 560	 951	 3,902	
Table 2
  Emerging market related oTC currency derivative stock 
  (USD billion)
Source: BIS.mAGyAR nemZeti bAnK
mnb bulletin • june 2010 34
interest differential just as much as he does not have to bear 
the risk of exchange rate fluctuations.
but borrowing in foreign exchange by households does not 
seem to be an effective ’investment’ for a number of reasons. 
Such deals are differentiated from the strategy adopted by 
professional investors in respect of five factors:
1.   Long-term  maturity.  Over  a  10-year  time  span,  the 
correctness of uiP cannot be empirically denied.8 High 
interest  rate  differentials  indicate  a  high  level  of 
differences  in  inflation  rates  or  a  high  level  of  risk 
premium.  inflation  differences  appear  in  nominal 
weakening of exchange rates over such a long period of 
time. it is highly likely that the priced risk will be realised 
over a 10-15 year period.
2.   No diversification. Professional investors hold a portfolio 
of high interest foreign currencies. Diversification can be 
used to reduce Ct risks to a great extent. However, the 
amount  of  idiosyncratic  risks  is  very  large  in  a  single 
currency  pair.  Darvas  (2009)  for  instance  studied  11 
currencies  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  provided 
someone had taken out a carry position 30 years ago in 
any of the individual currency counterparts, at least once 
during this period of time he must have suffered such an 
amount of loss which would have wiped out all of the 
gains accumulated up to then. this analysis cannot be 
applied one-to-one with regard foreign exchange debtors, 
as Darvas assumed that the investor keeps the original 
gearing ratio, while the ‘leverage‘ of households in retail 
markets will gradually diminish as the loan is amortised. 
nevertheless, this example is a good illustration of the 
potential risks.
3.   Cognitive  distortions  in  risk  assessment.  One  possible 
explanation for high carry yields is the peso problem. in 
other words, Ct strategies are profitable for a long time, 
and losses are rare but large (see the above example from 
Darvas). it can be assumed that non professional investors 
overemphasise  the  recent  performance  of  the  strategy, 
instead of considering potential risks when judging the 
risks of a loan taken out in foreign currency.9
4.   Externalities.  Households  are  in  a  more  favourable 
position than foreign carry traders from one point of 
view.  At  certain  levels,  they  are  protected  against 
nominal exchange rate volatility. the inflation related 
to  depreciation  appreciates  the  nominal  wealth  of 
households,  and  thus  the  higher  nominal  monthly 
payment is partially offset by higher nominal salaries 
and higher collateral value. However, whereas nominal 
changes in the exchange rate appear instantly in the 
amortisation instalment payable, they are only slowly 
and partially incorporated into domestic price levels. 
therefore,  this  kind  of  protection  does  not  really 
function  well  in  practical  terms.  Additionally,  a 
nominal weakening of the exchange rate will have the 
effect  of  reinforcing  the  devaluation  of  the  real 
exchange  rate  by  the  foreign  exchange  debtors 
themselves who generate real depreciation by refraining 
from  consumption  and  liquidating  their  real  estate 
collaterals.  this  way  the  other  debtors’  assets  and 
revenues will be reduced further when compared to the 
amount of debt.10
5.   Moral  hazard:  upon  deciding  in  favour  of  the  foreign 
exchange  denomination  of  a  potential  loan,  debtors 
probably  also  consider  that  the  government  will  assist 
them  in  the  case  of  a  substantial  weakening  of  the 
exchange rate. this may be especially important when 
the portfolio of open positions is very large. in such cases, 
economic  policy-makers  are  compelled  to  purchase 
insurance  tools  against  large-scale  weakening,  for 
instance  by  accumulating  large  amounts  of  foreign 
exchange reserves, the costs of which is also paid by those 
who have no loans in foreign exchange.
Chart 1














































10	For	externalities	related	to	foreign	exchange	loans,	see	for	instance	Caballero	&	Krishnamurthy	(2001),	and	Korinek	(2008).mnb bulletin • june 2010 35
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InTERnATIonAL EXPERIEnCES
Diversified CT is very profitable over the long run. in order 
to  illustrate  this  statement,  i  present  the  G10  Currency 
Harvest  index  by  Deutsche  bank  (bloomberg  code: 
DbHVG10u) and the cumulated performance of the S&P 
500  American  stock  index  in  Chart  1.  the  carry  index 
reflects the performance of an exchange traded fund (etF), 
which  declared  that  it  held  long  positions  in  the  three 
highest interest rate currencies and short positions in the 
three lowest interest rate currencies in the G10 universe. 
the  fund  operates  with  the  highest  attainable  leverage 
meaning  a  1/3-2/3  ratio  in  favour  of  debt  financing. 
Surprisingly, Ct outperformed the stock index substantially 
in this period, which can partly be attributed to the fact that 
the bear market at the beginning of the 2000s did not affect 
Ct. Since there is only a very weak correlation between Ct 
and stocks, it can prove to be a useful diversification tool.
the comparison above is doubtful not only because of the 
shortness of the period. the Ct index operates with gearing 
which enlarges returns. these can be reduced to a common 
denominator  when  returns  are  standardised  by  volatility 
(Sharpe-ratio). in this index, Ct appears to be just as good 
or  perhaps  slightly  better  than  the  stock  market.11  more 
complex strategies where the development of the portfolio 
is  shaped  by  considerations  other  than  the  differentials 
between interest rates have outstanding performances.12
CT risks are manifested in the negative skew of the returns. 
Chart 2 shows the fitted historic monthly return distributions 
of the two indices. Due to the leverage structure in part, the 
extent of standard deviation associated with Ct is larger, 
but  a  more  striking  feature  is  the  long  left  tail  of  the 
distribution. this pattern is seen clearly in Chart 1 as well. 
Disregarding  minor  interruptions,  Ct  was  a  profitable 
undertaking right from the beginning of the 2000s up to the 
crises in 2008, when a passive investor lost the cumulated 
profits of six years within a couple of weeks.
The distribution of high interest rate foreign currency returns 
is  skewed  towards  the  weakening  direction.  High  interest 
rate  currencies  undergo  slow  appreciation  periods, 
interrupted  by  sudden  declines  in  the  exchange  rate.  FX 
traders describe this feature as ‘high interest rate currencies 
walk up by the stairs and come down by the elevator’. When 
Ct is unwound on a large scale, target currencies suddenly 
weaken and financing currencies gain strength. this causes 
negative skew with the former and positive in the latter. For 
similar reasons the financing and target currencies have a 
negative correlation. to illustrate this, i present the trends 
in the exchange rates of the japanese yen and the brazilian 
real in Chart 3. it is clear that when the real weakened to a 
great  extent  (2001,  2002  and  2008)  the  yen  became 
stronger.  the  underlying  mechanism  is  most  probably 
explained  by  carry  traders  closing  their  long  real/yen 
positions. Correlation between the two currencies on daily 
yields is –0.14.
High interest rate currencies depend very much on global 
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in situations when the financing conditions of carry traders 
suddenly weaken. these investors finance themselves using 
loans, and when they have to de-leverage they are forced to 
sell  high  interest  foreign  exchanges  in  return  for  low 
interest ones. Provided that many traders do this at the 
same time, it may become a self-reinforcing cycle. investors 
in such situations are compelled to sell their high interest 
currencies even when they know that it will be strong again 
within  a  short  period  of  time.  the  larger  the  stock  of 
existing positions, the larger the extent of weakening can 
be.13 brunnermeier et al. (2008), Clarida et al. (2009) and 
Adrian et al. (2009) link the movements of high interest 
foreign  currencies  to  the  ViX  index,14  volatility  of  the 
target  currency  and  the  gearing  ratio  of  uS  investment 
banks.
Ct may weaken the exchange rate channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. in practical terms, the exchange 
rate of free floating currencies can be extremely volatile. 
this  can  be  partially  explained  by  speculation  activities. 
the  high  degree  of  exchange  rate  volatility  reduces  the 
speed of pass-through of exchange rate changes in domestic 
prices.  this  reduces  the  ability  of  the  central  bank  to 
influence inflation through the exchange rate. At the same 
time, volatile exchange rates deter domestic market players 
from being indebted in foreign exchange. this reinforces 
the interest channel of the transmission mechanism and is 
favourable from the point of view of financial stability.
CT  may  contribute  to  the  overvaluation  of  real  exchange 
rates which increases the risk of a balance of payments crisis. 
emerging market crashes are almost always preceded by a 
long  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate.15  Ct  may 
contribute  to  this  process  by  strengthening  the  nominal 
exchange rates.
A PoTEnTIAL EXPLAnATIon FoR THE 
CARRy TRADE PuZZLE
in relation to the stylised facts described above, the greatest 
puzzle is: Why is Ct so profitable and why does a positive 
interest  rate  differential  point  towards  appreciation?  the 
Sharpe-ratio  of  Ct  is  high  and  is  only  poorly  correlated 
with traditional instruments. in other words, those investors 
who  keep  their  money  in  the  latter  may  benefit  from 
allocating  a  part  of  their  portfolio  in  high  interest  rate 
foreign  currencies.  Such  increased  demand  would  then 
depress  Ct  yields  and  the  puzzle  would  disappear.  the 
question is: What is the risk which prevents investors from 
doing so?
if investors find high interest rate currencies more risky and 
their  expectations  are  rational,  the  uiP  equation  will  be 
modified as follows:
	 rt=dt – Et(st+1 – st),  (5)
where p is the risk premium and d is the interest differential. 
the equation above shows that a representative investor on 
average will earn the risk premium, the expected return by 
buying the high interest rate currency. According to this the 
investor will earn the same amount of profits by purchasing 
two similarly risky currencies even when their respective 
interest rates are very different. the central bank controls 
domestic short yields directly, but if the arbitrage condition 
described above is met, it will not be able to influence the 
expected returns of the foreign investors. this seemingly 
contradicts the very essence of Ct, which tells us that we 
should invest in high interest rate foreign exchanges.
At the same time, the train of thought above does not mean 
that  an  unexpected  increase  in  interest  rates  would  not 
strengthen the exchange rate, but this effect will manifest 
itself in the spot price and not the subsequent trajectory 







where  E   is  the  long-term  exchange  rate 
expectation.  if  the  interest  rate  differential  increases 
unexpectedly, it causes an immediate strengthening of the 
exchange  rate  and  a  prolonged  weakening  thereafter.   
A negative premium shock has the same effect.
Volatile risk premium
the most evident explanation argues that the Ct puzzle is 
not caused by the interest rate differential, but by the risk 
premium. When the central bank of the high interest rate 
currency reacts to risk premium shocks systematically, the 
increased  interest  rate  differential  will  point  towards 
appreciation, even though strengthening of the currency 
was  not  caused  by  the  interest  rate  but  by  the  shock 
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currencies  appreciate  because  their  risk  premia  are 
higher.17 
in emerging market countries, risk premia can be explained 
by the higher level of sovereign risk, and output is also more 
volatile  than  in  developed  countries.18  Volatility  of  the 
sovereign  risk  premium  may  be  caused  by  investors’ 
incomplete or imperfect information on the probability of 
bankruptcy  or  devaluation.  investors’  perception  on  the 
issue is updated upon the receipt of new information. Such 
new information may appear in economic or political news, 
or  in  the  decisions  made  by  other  investors  (whether 
instruments of the country in question are put or called). 
this phenomenon may lead to a herding effect. if a country 
turns  out  to  be  a  fashionable  investment  target,  such 
investors  will  also  buy  the  instruments  who  otherwise 
would not do so based solely on their own information.19
in countries with similar levels of sovereign risk, the positive 
risk premium attached to the high interest rate currency (in 
the boom phase) may be caused by the different stage of the 
boom,  as  opposed  to  the  one  in  the  lower  interest  rate 
period (in recession). the risk aversion of economic agents 
which are being affected by the recession increases, and they 
are therefore willing to buy the instruments of the other 
economy only when the premium is higher.20
Liquidity constraints
most probably, the risk aversion of representative agents in 
different countries is not sufficient to fully explain the Ct 
puzzle.  these  models  are  not  able  to  generate  such  an 
exchange rate risk premium which can be accommodated 
quantitatively  with  the  data  and  could  produce  currency 
collapses endogenously.21 uncertainty concerning sovereign 
risks cannot always be justified either.
the persistent high returns on Ct may be caused by the fact 
that too few agents invest in high interest rate currencies. 
explanations built on financial market frictions assume that 
most  investors  do  not  actively  trade  in  international 
instruments, and therefore such instruments are notoriously 
undervalued.  According  to  this  explanation,  Ct  will 
approximate  exchange  rates  to  the  fundamental  value. 
Carry traders are nearly risk neutral institutional investors 
who take up the largest possible position in the underpriced 
instruments when they see an arbitrage opportunity. Due to 
the problem of asymmetric information, they can only take 
positions up to a limited extent, and therefore mispricing 
can  persist  longer.22  According  to  this  concept,  the  risk 
premium  of  equation  (5)  can  be  explained  more  by  the 
financing constraints of the institutional investors active in 
the Ct business, rather than by the risk aversion of final 
investors.
When carry traders are hit by a loss due to an adverse shock, 
the investors financing them may lose confidence in them, 
which results in capital withdrawal and forced selling. this 
is manifested in stop-loss limits in practice. For instance, if 
the exchange rate weakens as the consequence of a non-
fundamental noise shock, an informed investor may want to 
increase his position taken in high interest rate currencies, 
since he reckons that the mispricing will be eliminated over 
time and an arbitrage profit may be made in addition to the 
usual yields. However, due to the initial losses, financing 
will be more difficult for him since his creditworthiness will 
be impaired with the loss of his assets’ value.23 thus the 
investor soon finds himself in a situation where he is unable 
to increase his positions and even must cut them back, thus 
aggravating  the  initial  shock.  thus,  volatility  of  the  risk 
premium is caused by these non-fundamental shocks and 
the mechanisms reinforcing them. this kind of liquidity risk 
is  taken  into  account  by  professional  investors  in  their 
decision making, which may be a partial explanation for the 
persistence  of  long-term  high  yields.  According  to 
calculations by Farhi et al. (2009), the risks associated with 
a sudden, severe fall may be an explanation for about one-
fourth of all Ct yields.
Distorted expectations
irrational expectations can also explain the uiP anomaly 
and the profitability of Ct. in practice, at least based on 
polls of market participants, market expectations cannot be 
regarded as undistorted estimates of actual exchange rate 
movements happening later on. An explanation for this may 
be that investors systematically underestimate the persistence 
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rate on a high interest foreign currency is raised unexpectedly, 
the exchange rate will strengthen, but the extent of this will 
depend  on  the  persistence  of  the  interest  rate  shock. 
Although  it  is  very  difficult  to  understand  why  investors 
never learn the real persistence of interest rate shocks, if 
expectations are indeed formed in this way, the exchange 
rate may strengthen for a prolonged period as a result of the 
interest  shock.24  this  can  be  explained  by  the  interest 
differential,  which  does  not  diminish  as  expected  in  the 
period after the shock and thus repeated positive interest 
shocks are exerted on market participants in each of the 
following periods.
A similar story is outlined by benczúr (2003), focusing on 
interest rate based disinflation periods. in his model, the 
distorted expectations of exchange rates are formed through 
parameter learning caused by the altered monetary regime. 
in the event for instance that actual disinflation is slower 
than  the  original  expectations  of  the  investors,  durable 
appreciation can be realised under rational expectations as 
well.
Exchange rate bubbles
the most common explanation for Ct is that speculators 
push  the  high  interest  rate  currency  with  their  own 
purchases higher and higher, in other words Ct causes a 
kind of exchange rate bubble. Since neither the fundamental 
real exchange rate nor the risk premium are variables which 
can be observed, the existence of such bubbles is difficult to 
prove ex-post as well. theoretical economists were sceptical 
about bubbles for a long time, since it is very difficult to 
understand why investors – who are clearly aware of the 
existence of the bubble – do not eliminate the mispricing. 
Riding the bubble entails the danger of the bubble being 
popped by others and thus agents who have invested in the 
bubble will lose money. Asset prices usually approach the 
fundamental value. According to a famous saying by milton 
Friedman, if speculators were to bet against fundamentals 
they would lose money on average.
there is a vast body of evidence, however, which indicates 
that professional investors buy overpriced instruments after 
all. it was Abreu & brunnermeier (2003) who first built up 
a  theoretically  consistent  bubble  model,  explaining  the 
survival of the bubble by asymmetric information. Plantin 
& Shin (2008) explain the trends in high interest foreign 
currencies by the formation of the exchange rate bubble. in 
such  a  case,  appreciation  is  caused  by  the  exchange  rate 
diverting from the fundamental level defined by equation 
(6) as a result of Ct inflows. the bubble will burst at a point 
in time which cannot be foreseen and this will cause sudden 
episodes  of  weakening.  bubbles  tend  to  burst  when  too 
many  investors  suddenly  realise  the  mispricing.  Such  a 
coordination  event  can  be  for  instance  the  disclosure  of 
macro data pointing towards weakening of the high interest 
currency.
this explanation of the Ct bubble is substantiated somewhat 
by the results of jorda and taylor (2009), who maintain that 
the profitability of Ct is diminishing with the strengthening 
of the real exchange rate. this will suggest a story (although 
it  cannot  be  regarded  as  positive  proof)  that  an  initially 
undervalued, high interest currency will attract speculators, 
who  will  strengthen  the  exchange  rate  by  their  buying 
pressure. the more overvalued a currency is, the greater the 
probability of a correction. Finally the bubble will burst, 
and the exchange rate becomes undervalued once again and 
the whole cycle begins again.
wAS CARRy TRADE A TyPICAL FEATuRE 
In HunGARy?
in  this  section,  i  investigate  whether  the  Ct  activity  of 
foreign investors in the past may have been important in 
certain  periods.  unfortunately,  identification  of  Ct 
positions  is  extremely  difficult,  and  therefore  speculative 
activity can only be estimated with approximation.
According to the calculations of Csávás (2008), the expected 
distribution  of  Hungarian  forint  exchange  rates  was 
continuously  skewed  toward  weakening  in  the  sample 
tested. this feature can be seen with all carry currencies. in 
24	For	more	details,	see	Gourinchas	&	Tornell	(2004),	and	Bacchetta	&	van	Wincoop	(2006).
Chart 4
Interest differentials for a number of high yielding 
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the case of HuF, however, another cause is also possible. 
High level of external liabilities may cause an exchange rate 
crisis without any Ct, the risk of which is priced by the 
option  markets.  Furthermore,  HuF  was  sometimes  very 
close to the edge of the intervention band which limited 
additional strengthening.
by international standards, the interest rate differential of 
HuF was still very significant in the 2000s, although it had 
the declined greatly compared to the 1990s. even if this 
measure is standardised with the implied volatility of the 
exchange rate, HuF still seems to be an attractive investment 
opportunity  (Chart  4).  Such  differences  in  interest  rates, 
however, can only be compared when it is assumed that the 
exchange rate expectations of the market is that exchange 
rates will not change in the upcoming period, which can 
usually be refused based on analyst polls.25
Exposure of foreigners to HuF
First, it is worthwhile to investigate the HuF exposure of 
individual sectors. Carry traders must assume an exchange 
rate risk: the risk premium cannot be earned with a covered 
position. Aggregate HuF positions are shown in Chart 5. 
non-residents’  exposure  was  remarkably  stable  over  this 
period,  and  only  a  slight  increase  was  seen  up  to  2004. 
Hungarian households were the only sector which increased 
its exposure to HuF. upon the discontinuation of the HuF-
denominated  subsidised  housing  loan  programme,  the 
foreign  currency  loan  portfolio  experienced  sudden 
explosive  growth,  and  thus  households  accumulated  a 
substantial  amount  of  the  HuF  position.  this  trend  was 
later joined by companies.
Despite  the  high  interest  differential,  foreigners  took 
positions against HuF en masse. namely, the Hungarian 
banking  system  partly  converted  the  HuF-denominated 
assets into foreign currency as well, in order to meet the 
demand of the retail sector for foreign currency debts. this 
conversion  was  mostly  done  on  the  FX-swap  market.26 
Chart 6 presents the cumulative value of the daily changes 
in the non-resident FX-swap portfolio against HuF. it can 
be clearly seen that foreigners were in net positions against 
HuF on this market all along.27 Such positions were partly 
used to cover exchange rate risks associated with their HuF 
instruments,  and  partly  they  did  indeed  take  positions 
speculating on the weakening of the Hungarian forint. in 
both cases, interest differentials are paid for by the foreigners 
either because it makes sense to cover the exchange rate risk 
this way or because they expected a weakening exceeding 
the actual differences between the interest rates.
Since the foreign indebtedness observed during the 2000s 
was not associated with a similar increase of HuF exposure 
of foreigners, it means that the Ct activities of foreigners 
played no role in this process. this does not mean that carry 
traders were not present on the foreign exchange markets. 
in past years, foreigners held HuF positions ranging up to 
5-10 per cent of Hungarian GDP, part of which might have 
been held by Ct funds. most probably, these transactions 
were also concluded on the FX-swap market. Provided a 
non-resident investor takes up a carry position in favour of 
HuF, it will be seen in the reduction of their swap stock. in 
certain  periods,  it  was  observed  that  the  swap  stock  did 
indeed  diminish  significantly.  it  is  conceivable  that 
Hungarian  forint  Ct  also  played  a  role  during  these 
periods. this speculative activity may also have an impact 
on the exchange rate dynamics. Swap reduction (which may 
be caused by Ct-inflow) implies usually stronger exchange 
rates, while an increase (which may be due to closing of Ct 
positions)  usually  entails  weakening  of  the  Hungarian 
forint. Calculated on first differences thus filtering out the 
trend, the correlation coefficient between changes in HuF 
and the swap portfolio ranges up to nearly 0.6.
Chart 5
Hungarian forint positions of certain sectors 
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Correlations
One  sign  of  Ct  activity  may  be  strengthening  of  the 
correlation  between  the  exchange  rates  of  the  target 
currency and typical Ct currencies. Chart 7 presents the 
exchange rates of HuF and the new Zealand dollar (kiwi). 
the latter can be regarded as one of the most typical carry 
currencies. it is remarkable that exchange rate volatility of 
the  kiwi  dollar  is  substantially  higher  than  that  of  the 
Hungarian  forint.  As  a  result  of  continuous  Ct  activity 
during the 2000s, the kiwi dollar appreciated by 50 per 
cent,  and  then  fell  60  per  cent  in  the  crisis  of  the  year 
2008.28 Any correlation in the two time series can be seen 
at first glance at around 2006 and in the crisis period.
For the purposes of a more formal investigation, conditional 
correlations  for  a  number  of  other  emerging  market 
currencies and the Ct-index were calculated.29 in the case 
of  the  South  African  rand  and  the  brazilian  real  the 
counterpart  was  uSD,  for  the  rest  it  was  euR.  Positive 
correlation between an exchange rate and a Ct-index may 
mean that carry traders are relatively important players in 
the  foreign  exchange  market.  instruments  in  the  same 
investment category show usually strong correlation, which 
may be due to the funds trading in entire portfolios. For 
instance, they buy or sell high interest foreign currencies all 
at once.
the calculated correlations can be seen in Charts 8 and 9. 
emerging currencies showed a positive correlation with Ct 
for the entire period. in the first half of the period only the 
correlations of the real and the rand are outstanding. From 
2006 on, the co-movement between the carry index and the 
local currencies increased everywhere, except for the Czech 
Republic  and  Slovakia.  According  to  this,  the  massive 
withdrawal of Ct may have played a role in the depreciation 
wave  of  2008  and  2009  in  the  emerging  markets  too. 
Currently, Ct activity may be at historical heights in the 
market of forint, zloty, real and rand. it is worth highlighting 
Chart 6
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that according to our indicator Ct activity on the Hungarian 
forint market increased to historical highs in the time when 
the  economy  ran  a  current  account  surplus  this  also 
underlines the fact that net capital inflow and Ct activity 
are not the same phenomena.
no  significant  correlation  was  found  between  HuF 
correlation and the interest rate differential. increase was 
partly caused by international factors (this tendency can be 
observed  for  several  currencies).  it  is  probable  that  the 
abolition of the intervention band in 2008 contributed to 
the increase in speculative activity. HuF volatility in the 
past was substantially lower than other typical Ct currencies 
(see Chart 7). Provided Ct activity on the domestic market 
is indeed so strong as indicated by the correlation level, it 
can  be  assumed  that  HuF  will  also  face  more  extreme 
appreciation cycles.
ConCLuSIonS
Ct is a leveraged investment style applied by specialised 
institutional investors. Foreign exchange market funds take 
up  their  positions  predominantly  through  derivative 
instruments, and thus this kind of capital inflow does not 
entail  financing  for  the  receiving  country.  High  interest 
currencies  undergo  prolonged  appreciation  cycles 
interrupted by sudden falls. tendencies seen in the exchange 
rates  of  the  high  interest  (Ct  receiving)  currencies  are 
shaped by the global liquidity conditions.
Foreigners’ Ct activity did not contribute to the indebtedness 
of the Hungarian economy. the exchange rate risk exposure 
associated with the increase of indebtedness was assumed 
entirely by resident agents – primarily households. At the 
same time, the increased correlation coefficient of HuF and 
the  Ct-index  may  suggest  that  the  HuF  exposure  of 
foreigners may have shifted to Ct funds in the past three 
years  to  a  greater  extent  than  before.  Although  this 
correlation coefficient is merely an imperfect indicator of 
actual Ct activities, if speculation on HuF is indeed so 
strong,  the  evolution  of  more  serious  appreciation  cycles 
can be anticipated in the future.
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